CHIEF JUSTICE RICHARD J. HUGHES:
LEADERSHIP AND LIBERAL ACTIVISM
by
Michal R. Belknap*
When RichardJ. Hughes retired as Chief Justice of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in 1979, Governor Brendan T. Byrne remarked that he was leaving behind "a legacy by which succeeding
generations will bejudged."' Hughes's colleague, Justice Morris
Pashman, observed that the retiring chief justice had "admirably" filled the shoes of his renowned predecessors Arthur T.
Vanderbilt and Joseph Weintraub. 2 Similar praise also came
from William J. Brennan, Jr., a one time member of the New
Jersey Supreme Court, and now senior Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court.
Retirement brought both praise and retrospective articles
analyzing Richard J. Hughes's judicial service and his contributions to various areas of the law.4 As these articles explained,
although best known as a popular Democratic Governor of New
Jersey, Hughes also had been an outstanding judge. He was an
outstanding judicial administrator, who labored and lobbied effectively to improve the efficiency of the courts. Hughes also displayed a notable activism on the bench, using the powers of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey to promote his liberal ideals.
* B.A. (1965), U.C.L.A.; M.A. (1967) and Ph.D. (1973), University of Wisconsin; J.D. (1981), The University of Texas. Associate Professor, California Western
School of Law. Professor Belknap wishes to thank Professor Catherine McCauliff
and Ms. Loni Freeman for their valuable assistance with this article.
I Letter from Governor Brendan Byrne (undated), 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 2 (1979).
2 Pashman, A Tribute to Richard]. Hughes: Judge and Administrator, 10 SETON HALL
L. REV. 86, 86 (1979).
3 Brennan, Introduction: ChiefJustice Hughes andJustice Mountain, 10 SETON HALL
L. REV. xii (1979).
4 See, e.g., Clapp, ChiefJustice Hughes and the Unification of the Courts, 10 SETON
HALL L. REV. 15 (1979); Milmed, ChiefJustice RichardJ.Hughes-Architect of a Responsive Administrative Process, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 78 (1979); Pashman, supra note 2,
at 86; Schreiber, Statutory Interpretation: Some Comments on Two Judicial I'iewpoints, 10
SETON HALL L. REV. 94 (1979); Sullivan, A Legacyfor New Jersey, 10 SETON HALL L.
REV. 107 (1979); Editor's Note, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 7 (1979).
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I.

PREPARATION

Background and Education

A.

Richard J. Hughes came to the chief justiceship well prepared to lead the New Jersey judiciary. He brought to the
supreme court a unique blend of judicial and executive experience, which equipped him not only to adjudicate but also to improve the administration of justice. Hughes had acquired
valuable leadership, training, and experience in the political
arena. That he devoted a substantial part of his career to politics
is hardly surprising, for it was practically in his blood. The governor's father, Richard P. Hughes, had served as Burlington
County Democratic Chairman and for thirty-four years was a
member of the Democratic State Committee. In addition, the
elder Hughes held positions as postmaster, Mayor of Florence,
New Jersey, and member of the state's civil service commission.5
While serving as warden of the Trenton State Prison, Hughes introduced his son to the legal system.6
The younger Hughes acquired his more formal education at
St. Joseph's College in Philadelphia 7 and at the New Jersey Law
School (Rutgers) from which he received his L.L.B. in 1931.8 His
New Jersey Law School degree distinguished Hughes from other
New Jersey Supreme Court justices, who typically obtained their
legal education at private institutions in other states. 9 Firmly
rooted in the soil of NewJersey, Hughes entered private practice
in Trenton after passing the bar exam. He simultaneously became active in Democratic politics, winning the presidency of the
New Jersey Young Democrats in 1937 and running unsuccessfully for Congress as a "Roosevelt Democrat" in 1938. Political
activism later led the future chiefjustice into federal legal service.
In 1939, Hughes was appointed an assistant United States Attorney, a position he held until 1945.")
Sederis, Mr. Hughes Remembers, 14
(I See id. Years later Hughes recalled
prisoners transferred to the New Jersey
20, 1976, § XI, at 19, col. 1. For this
"liberal." Id.
5

N.J. REP. 13, 13 (1985).
that as warden his father ordered psychotic
Hospital for the Insane. N.Y. Times, June
he was branded a "bleeding heart" and a

7 J. PRESS, WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN POLITICS

732 (7th ed. 1979-80).

8 Sederis, supra note 5, at 13.

9 A 1972 study found that of the seven justices who sat on the New Jersey
Supreme Court during the period 1961-1968, five had attended well-known private
law schools (Yale, Stanford, Northwestern, Duke) located outside New Jersey. Canon, Characteristics and CareerPatterns of: Slate Supreme Courtfiustices, 45 Sr. Go'r 34,

34-35 (1972).
")

PRESS,

supra note 7, at 732.
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Lower Court Judge

After leaving the United States Attorney's office, Hughes
embarked upon a decade of service in New Jersey's lower courts.
From 1948 until 1952, he sat on the Mercer County Court." In
1952, Governor Alfred E. Driscoll elevated him to the Superior
Court of New Jersey and, in 1957, Chief Justice Weintraub
named Hughes to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.
Hughes served less than a year before leaving the bench to return to the practice of law because he was running out of
money. '

2

By preparing for his service on the New Jersey Supreme
Court through an extended apprenticeship on lower tribunals,
Hughes emulated about half of the jurists who have served on
the highest state courts during the twentieth century. 1 3 He also
followed the example of William Howard Taft, another former
chief executive (He was president from 1909-1913) turned chief
justice, who headed the United States Supreme Court from 1921
until 1930.14
While sitting on the Mercer County and superior court
benches, Hughes familiarized himself with problems of criminal
law and procedure, sentencing, and parole. A majority of the
opinions written by Hughes during his four years as a county
court judge disposed of petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed
by prisoners confined at the state penitentiary in Trenton.' 5
1' Lynch, The Hughes Legacy: Activism in Court, N.Y. Times, August 6, 1978, § XI,
at 15, col. 1; see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 99, col. 2; Sederis, supra note 5, at
13-14.
12 In 1959, Hughes, then a widower with three sons and a daughter, married
Betty Sullivan Murphy, a widow with three children of her own. Sederis, supra note
5, at 14. The couple had three more children. Hughes was not making enough
money as a judge to support his large family so he "reluctantly quit the bench and
went into private practice and was instantly quite successful." Id.
13 A study based on a 16 state sample determined that almost half of the American state supreme court justices who served during the period 1900-1970 had spent
five years or more on lower court benches before appointment or election to their
states' supreme court. Kagan, Infelise & Detlefsen, American State Supreme CourtJustices, 1900-1970, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 371, 375 (1984).
14 Before becoming Chief Justice, Taft, like Hughes, served on a lower court
within the same judicial system, sitting for eight years on the United States Court of
Appeals lr the Sixth Circuit. He had also been a state superior court judge in
Ohio for three years. I H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD
"I'ArV 94-107, 121-47 (1939).
i, See Ex Parte Sabongy, 18 NJ. Super. 334, 87 A.2d 59 (Mercer Ctv. Ct. 1952):
In re Hodge. 17 N.J. Super. 198, 85 A.2d 327 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 24 N.J.
Super. 564, 95 A.2d 156 (App. Div. 1953); In re Mahoney, 17 NJ. Super. 99, 85
A.2d 338 (Mercer Ctv. Ct. 1951); In re Carter, 14 N.J. Super. 591, 82 A.2d 652
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While on the lower court bench, Hughes achieved a reputation as
an authority on probation systems.' 6 Not surprisingly, he wrote
fewer opinions dealing with crime and criminals after moving up
from the Mercer County bench to the superior court.17 During
his tenure on the appellate division, however, Hughes authored
opinions dealing with the presumption of innocence,' 8 the right
to counsel,' 9 extradition,2 ° and wiretapping.2 '
Although much of his experience on New Jersey's lower
courts involved criminal law and procedure, Hughes also established a reputation as an authority on juvenile problems. Cognizant of that reputation, Chief Justice Vanderbilt appointed him
chairman of the New Jersey Supreme Court's Committee on Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts.2 2 Strangely, though,
Hughes wrote few opinions in family law cases.2 3 On the other
hand, he authored a substantial number dealing with various as(Mercer Cty. Ct. 1951); In re Legdon, 13 N.J. Super. 405, 80 A.2d 490 (Mercer Cty.
Ct. 1951); In re Zee, 13 N.J. Super. 312, 80 A.2d 480 (Mercer Cty. Ct.), aff'dsub non.
State v. Zee, 16 N.J. Super. 171, 84 A.2d 29 (App. Div. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
931 (1952); In re Trignani, 13 N.J. Super. 306, 80 A.2d 371 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1951);
In re Zienowicz, 12 N.J. Super. 563, 79 A.2d 912 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1951); In re McBride, 12 N.J. Super. 402, 79 A.2d 737 (Mercer Cty. Ct.), aff'd sub nom. State v.
McBride, 15 N.J. Super. 436, 83 A.2d 627 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894
(1951); In re Damato, 11 NJ. Super. 576, 78 A.2d 734 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1951); In re
Benton, 10 N.J. Super. 595, 77 A.2d 517 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1950); In re De Luccia, 10
N.J. Super. 374, 76 A.2d 304 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1950); In re Macejka, 10 N.J. Super.
393, 76 A.2d 843 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1950); In re Fitzpatrick, 9 N.J. Super. 511, 75
A.2d 636 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 14 N.J. Super. 213, 82 A.2d 8 (App. Div.
1951).
'" See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 99, col. 2.
17 But see State v. Winne, 21 N.J. Super. 180, 91 A.2d 65 (Law Div. 1952) (prosecutor's failure to perform discretionary duty not indictable offense absent
corruption).
18 See State v. Corby, 47 N.J. Super. 493, 497, 136 A.2d 271, 274 (App. Div.
1957) (concurring opinion).
19 See Worbetz v. Goodman, 47 N.J. Super. 391, 136 A.2d I (App. Div. 1957).
20 See Passalaqua v. Biehler, 46 N.J. Super. 63, 133 A.2d 667 (App. Div. 1957).
21 See State v. Vanderhave, 47 N.J. Super. 483, 136 A.2d 296 (App. Div. 1957),
aff 'd, 27 N.J. 313, 142 A.2d 609 (1958).
22 N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 99, col. 2.
2- But see Cahen v. Cahen, 47 N.J. Super. 141, 135 A.2d 535 (App. Div. 1957)
(husband's support action of wife and child); In re Rollins, 65 A.2d 667 (Mercer Cv.
Ct. 1949) (guardianship). Hughes also wrote two opinions dealing with decedents'
estates. See Vezzetti v. Shields, 22 N.J. Super. 397, 92 A.2d 28 (App. Div. 1952); In
re Fisher, 17 N.J. Super. 207, 85 A.2d 562 (Mercer Ctv. Ct. 1952).
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pects of tort law,24 in addition to contract,2 suretyship, 26 workers
2
compensation, 2 7 and landlord-tenant casess.
Hughes's years on
in deciding evidence 29

the lower courts also gave him experience
and civil procedure questions.3 0
Particularly significant in Hughes's judicial education was
what he learned about the possibilities for and limitations upon
judicial policing of the other branches of government. Twice,
Judge Hughes decided cases challenging the actions of local officials on constitutional grounds,3 ' and three times he resolved
disputes over whether officials had acted in compliance with applicable state statutes.3 2 Probably his most spectacular local gov-

24 See Fenning v. S.G. Holding Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 110, 135 A.2d 346 (App.
Div. 1957) (libel); Fidelis Factors Corp. v. DuLane Hatchery, Ltd., 47 N.J. Super.
132, 135 A.2d 550 (App. Div. 1957) (conversion); Nierman v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 46 N.J. Super. 566, 135 A.2d 210 (App. Div. 1957) (negligence); State v.
South Amboy Trust Co., 46 N.J. Super. 497, 135 A.2d 38 (Law Div. 1957) (conversion); Atwood v. Board of Trustees, 26 N.J. Super. 607, 98 A.2d 348 (Essex Cty. Ct.
1953) (negligence); Clement v. Atlantic Casualty Ins. Co., 25 N.J. Super. 96, 95
A.2d 494 (Essex Cty. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 13 N.J. 439, 100 A.2d 273 (1953) (interspousal immunity); Kelly v. Hoffman, 9 N.J. Super. 422, 74 A.2d 922 (Law Div.
1950) (defamation).
25 See Union County U-Drive It v. Blomeley, 46 N.J. Super. 92, 133 A.2d 714
(Law Div. 1957), aff'd, 48 N.J. Super. 252, 137 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1958); City of
East Orange v. Gilchrist, 41 N.J. Super. 362, 125 A.2d 225 (App. Div. 1956).
26 See Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 27 N.J. Super. 189, 98 A.2d 706
(Law Div. 1953), rev'd, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d 288 (1954); U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. Davis, 21 N.J. Super. 405, 91 A.2d 351 (App. Div. 1952), aff'd, 12 N.J. 365,
97 A.2d 161 (1953).
27 See Furda v. Scammell China Co., 17 N.J. Super. 339, 86 A.2d 39 (Mercer Cty.
Ct. 1952); Todd v. Northeastern Poultry Producers Council, 9 N.J. Super. 348, 73
A.2d 863 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1950).
28 See Farber v. Shell Oil Co., 47 N.J. Super. 48, 135 A.2d 243 (App. Div. 1957);
Donmart Motors, Inc. v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 27 N.J. Super. 427, 99
A.2d 534 (App. Div. 1953).
29 See State v. Campisi, 47 N.J. Super. 455, 136 A.2d 292 (App. Div. 1957); State
v. Micci, 46 N.J. Super. 454, 134 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1957).
30 See Balady v. Casciglio, 36 N.J. Super. 475, 116 A.2d 521 (App. Div. 1955)
(jurisdiction over the person); Whiteman Food Products Co. v. Prodotti Alimentari,
27 N.J. Super. 359, 99 A.2d 434 (App. Div. 1953), rev d, 31 N.J. Super. 277, 106
A.2d 321 (App. Div. 1954) (attachment); White v. Shaw, 6 N.J. Super. 508, 69 A.2d
611 (Monmouth Cty. Ct. 1949) (compromise verdict).
31 See Township of Berkeley Heights v. Board of Educ., 40 N.J. Super. 549, 123
A.2d 810 (Law Div. 1956), aff'd, 23 N.J 276, 128 A.2d 857 (1957) (upholding constitutionality of challenged procedural and tax statutes and holding that plaintiff's
sole remedy lies in appeal to State Division of Tax Appeals); Baldwin Constr. Co. v.
Essex County Bd. of Taxation, 24 N.J. Super. 252, 93 A.2d 800 (Law Div.), aff'd, 27
NJ. Super. 240, 99 A.2d 214 (App. Div. 1953) (holding taxpayers who allege violation of rights under equal protection clause do not have to exhaust administrative
remedies).
:2 See Perry v. Giuliano, 46 N.J. Super. 550, 135 A.2d 24 (App. Div. 1957) (relusing to issue writ of mandamus ordering count%, clerk 1o change position of Con-
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ernmental ruling was In re Union County Grand Jury. 33 There,
Hughes upheld the right of the grand jury to return a presentment criticizing political interference in the operation of the Elizabeth Police Department and called upon the Elizabeth City
Council to fund a thorough study of the department's operations.34 In disputes between citizens and state agencies, Hughes
ruled in favor of both the New Jersey Highway Authority 35 and
the Board of Utility Commissioners. 6 In Trinka Services, Inc. v.
State Board of Mortuary Science, 7 however, he held unconstitutional, as an improper exercise of the police power, a statute
under which another administrative body had prohibited corporations from engaging in the mortuary business.
The Trinka opinion and others written during his years on
the Mercer County and superior courts disclose much about the
sort of judge Richard J. Hughes was becoming. These opinions
reveal a jurist whose study of the law had not robbed him of his
common sense. An example is Baldwin Construction Co. v. Essex
County Board of Taxation,3 8 a case brought by a group of taxpayers

who claimed that the evaluation of their property violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that the plaintiffs had
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. 9 Its contention
was that in failing to appeal to the county board and the Division
of Tax Appeal, the plaintiffs had not acted as the "legislative
scheme" required.40 In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, Judge Hughes recognized that, given the thrust of recent
appellate division decisions, the plaintiffs were ultimately likely to
prevail on the constitutional issue. He further recognized that
servative Party candidate on ballot); Phillips v. Board of Adjustment, 41 N.J. Super.
549, 125 A.2d 562 (Law Div. 1956), rev'd, 44 N.J. Super. 491, 130 A.2d 866 (App.
Div. 1957) (overturning zoning exemption granted by municipal board of adjustment); Gerber v. Township of Springfield, 38 N.J. Super. 556, 120 A.2d 63 (Law
Div. 1956) (upholding as authorized by statute restrictive covenant in deed to riverfront land sold by city).
33 44 N.J. Super. 443, 130 A.2d 903 (Law Div. 1957).
34 Id. at 446-47, 130 A.2d at 905.
35 See New Jersey Highway Authority v. Rue, 41 N.J. Super. 385, 125 A.2d 305
(App. Div. 1956) (condemnation).
36 See In re West Jersey & Seashore R.R. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 543, 135 A.2d 35
(App. Div. 1957) (challenge to board's refusal to approve railroad's sale of unused
real estate to particular buyer).
'17 40 N.J. Super. 238, 122 A.2d 668 (Law Div. 1956).
3 24 N.J. Super. 252, 93 A.2d 800 (Law Div. 1952), aff'd, 27 N.J. Super. 240, 99
A.2d 214 (App. Div. 1953).
39 Id. at 260, 93 A.2d at 803.
40 Id.
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administrative bodies could not consider the constitutional issue
and must follow the statute, which mandated appraisals be based
on "true value," even if this produced discriminatory results. 4'
He also noted that, if the plaintiffs pursued an administrative appeal, they would be asking the county board to act in a quasijudicial capacity on the propriety of its own actions in its administrative role. 4 2 "[T]he administrative remedy,"

Hughes con-

cluded, "is at best uncertain,
if it is not, indeed, nonexistent in
43
the practical sense."

Hughes also displayed a capacity to cut through the legal
complexities of a case and arrive at a common sense solution in
handling habeas corpus proceedings. In one of these proceedings, for example, the petitioner sought release from prison on
the grounds that he had been denied his right to counsel under
both the state and Federal constitutions. 44 The prisoner, described as "uneducated" and "of practically moron-grade intelligence," failed to raise this issue during his trial.45 Hughes
realized "our courts have held that the right to counsel is not
abridged by the mere failure to assign counsel, and that failure to
request such assignment justifies a presumption of waiver of the
privilege." ' 46

He opined, however, that the "presumption of

waiver is clearly overcome in the instant circumstances, in which
common justice must deny its validity in any realistic sense. ' 47 In
contrast, when an intelligent prisoner, who had violated parole
by committing another offense, contended that he should not
have to complete the balance of his first sentence because the
judge who imposed the second (and longer) sentence had not
specified that the two penalties were to be served consecutively,
Hughes rejected his sophistic argument. 48 The common sense
reason which he gave was that if a parole violator is not "required
to serve some time in prison in addition to that imposed for an
offense committed while on parole, he not only escapes punishment by being required to serve the unexpired portion of his
original sentence, but the disciplinary power of the paroling auId.
1I.
43 1d.
44 See
45 Id.
46 Id.
4'

42

at 266-73, 93 A.2d at 806-10.
at 273-74, 93 A.2d at 810.
at 276, 93 A.2d at 811.
Ex Parte Carter, 14 N.J. Super. 591, 82 A.2d 652 (Mercer Ctv. Ct. 1951).
at 594, 82 A.2d at 654.
at 598, 82 A.2d at 656.

47 Id.
48 Ex Parte Macejka, 10 N.J. Super. 393, 397-400, 76 A.2d 843, 845-47 (Mercer
Ctv. Ct. 1950).
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thority would be practically nullified." 4 9
The fact that Judge Hughes tended to decide cases on the
basis of common sense does not mean that he lacked legal knowledge. The future chief justice included in his very first opinion
on the Mercer County court a lengthy discussion of the development of the law governing guardianship of incompetents, which
exhibited considerable familiarity with both British and American
legal history.5" In addition, his opinion in State v. Winne 5' stands
as a heavily documented essay on prosecutorial discretion and
criminal nonfeasance by a quasi-judicial officer.
Even when displaying the fruits of his legal scholarship, the
opinions of the young Judge Hughes often made lively reading.
In the Winne case, for example, he wrote that if the indictment of
the prosecutor-defendant for nonfeasance was upheld
the course of justice in our State would be polluted in its administration by a body of cringing and faceless prosecutors,
who would no longer fulfill their ancient mission as ministers
ofjustice, but would prostitute justice in their own self-interest
and turn their backs on what is right in favor of what is expedient and popular. Such prosecutors, understandably enough,
would resolve every doubt in favor of prosecution, and there
would be such a surfeit of petty and baseless prosecutions as
to sicken the mind of one who had belief in the grandeur and
the probity of the administration of public justice."
The lower court opinions of the future chief justice revealed
more about his writing style than about his judicial philosophy; they
did no more than suggest that this son of a prison warden was a
strong proponent of "law and order." The young Judge Hughes
showed compassion for a habeas petitioner of "moron-grade intelli4, Id. at 399-400, 76 A.2d at 847; cf. In re Damato, 11 N.J. Super. 576, 78 A.2d
734 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1951) (rejecting contention of prisoner released early due to
clerical error that state could not reincarcerate him).
50 See In re Rollins, 65 A.2d 667, 679-82 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1949).
51 21 N.J. Super. 180, 91 A.2d 65 (Law Div. 1952), rev'd, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63
(1953). In reversing Hughes, ChiefJustice Vanderbilt emphasized that by failing to
take affirmative action, the prosecutor-defendant violated a duty imposed on him
by a New.Jersey statute. 11-7inne, 12 N.J. at 165-69, 96 A.2d at 69-72.
52 Iinne, 21 N.J. Super. at 224, 91 A.2d at 87. In one appellate division opinion.
reversing a conviction for bookmaking, Hughes wrote of the defendants' confectionary store:
This establishment was the sitits of the offenses alleged, the State contending that he there had interrupted the blameless tenor of his ordinary business pursuits with forays into the forbidden commerce of
accepting and recording wagers, made by the incurablv sanguine, upon
the running of' horses, mares and geldings, in violation of law.
State v. Micci, 46 N.. Super. 454, 457, 134 A.2d 805, 807 (App. Div. 1957).
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gence, ' ' 53 worried about possible erosion of the presumption of innocence,5 4 and once alerted a prisoner's attorney to the fact that his
client's sentence had been improperly computed and the prisoner
was entitled to be released earlier.5 5 Generally, however, Judge
Hughes displayed little sympathy for criminal offenders. In a memorandum prepared for the Committee on Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, he urged judges not to show excessive leniency
toward juvenile repeat offenders who posed a threat to the community. 56 His judicial opinions reflected the same attitude. For example, in Worbetz v. Goodman,5 7 Hughes rejected the contention of one
frequent patron of the criminal justice system that his rights had
been violated because he was allowed, without being represented by
an attorney, to enter a plea of guilty to an armed robbery charge,
thereby subjecting himself to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. Hughes declared that the defendant not only "was not constitutionally aggrieved in the basic proceedings, but richly deserved
the sentences imposed under legislation by which the modern state
has attempted to rid itself of the scourge of habitual criminality .. .,""In In re Hodge, 59 although conceding that the rights of the
prisoner before him might have been violated when he was kept
away while the jury returned its verdict against him, Judge Hughes
denied the petitioner's request for a writ of habeas corpus.6 ° It was
his belief that "discretion to withhold the writ, even in the face of
claimed jurisdictional defect in the proceedings attacked, must be
exercised where warranted, in order to prevent the virtual collapse
6
of this important phase of the administration of criminal justice." '
In sum, Hughes was a judge who was deeply concerned with the
effect of crime on society. He once observed that "the strength and
53 See Ex ParteCarter, 14 N.J. Super. 591, 593, 82 A.2d 652, 653 (Mercer Cty. Ct.
1951); see also supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
54 See State v. Corby, 47 N.J. Super. 493, 505-08, 136 A.2d 271, 278-80 (App.
Div. 1957) (Hughes, J., concurring).
55 See Sims v. Read, 28 NJ. Super. 557, 564-65, 101 A.2d 112, 115 (Law Div.
1953).
56 Lynch, supra note 11, at 15, col. 1.
57 47 N.J. Super. 391, 136 A.2d 1 (App. Div. 1957).
58 Id. at 408, 136 A.2d at 10.
59 17 N.J. Super. 198, 85 A.2d 327 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 24 N.J. Super.
564, 95 A.2d 156 (App. Div. 1953).
60 Hodge, 17 NJ. Super. at 204-06, 85 A.2d at 330-31.
6 Id. at 206, 85 A.2d at 331. In Hodge, Hughes was particularly concerned because another of the petitioner's claims was, in his opinion, "false and probably
intentionally perjurious." Id. at 204, 85 A.2d at 329.
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integrity of the police department ' '6 2 was crucial to a city's welfare.
The reason was that "[n]o community desires to live a hairbreadth
above the criminal level, or without the protection of an efficient
guardian of the public order and safety." 6 3
While disclosing a commitment to preserving law and order
and a belief that "courts should not be influenced by political considerations lest the true course of the impartial administration of
justice be polluted,"6 4 Hughes's opinions contained few other hints
of the judicial philosophy that would characterize his chief justiceship. They suggested that he viewed the power of the judiciary as
limited and largely derivative, requiring clear legislative sanction
before it could be exercised. 6 5 Hughes tolerated what appeared to
be a systemic injustice because of what he regarded as a lack of clear
legal authority for reform. 6 6 The closest the future chief justice
came to "judicial activism," 6 7 which would later animate his work on
the New Jersey Supreme Court, was pointing out to the legislature
"an unfortunate gap" in the statutes, which could "be repaired quite
simply by legislative action.... 68
C.

Governor

Before this practitioner of judicial restraint assumed the
center seat on the state supreme court, he spent two terms
"wrestling" with that legislature as NewJersey's governor. From
1962 to 1970, Hughes acquired a unique and valuable perspective on the body to which, as a lower court judge, he had so readily and consistently deferred. Several members of other supreme
62 In re Union County Grand Jury, 44 N.J. Super. 443, 447, 130 A.2d 903, 905

(Law Div. 1957).
63 Id. at 448, 130 A.2d at 905.
64 Id., 130 A.2d at 906.
65 See, e.g., Perry v. Giuliano, 46 N.J. Super. 550, 556, 135 A.2d 24, 27 (App. Div.
1957) ("where, as here, the Legislature has ordained no clearly stated course of
duty, the court may not interfere"); In re Fitzpatrick, 9 N.J. Super. 511, 519, 75 A.2d
636, 639 (Mercer Cty. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 14 N.J. Super. 213, 82 A.2d 8 (App. Div.
1951) ("this is beyond the power of this court to do").
66 See, e.g., In re Mahoney, 17 N.J. Super. 99, 108, 85 A.2d 338, 343 (Mercer Cty.
Ct. 1951); In re Fitzpatrick, 9 N.J. Super. 511, 521, 75 A.2d 636, 640-41 (Mercer
Cty. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 14 N.J. Super. 213, 82 A.2d 8 (App. Div. 1951).
67 As Wallace Mendelson has observed, -[t]here is no official definition" ofjudicial activism. In his words, "professing no explicit overall philosophy, activism is
what activism does." W. MENDELSON, THE SUPREME COURT: LAW AND DISCRETION
14-15 (1967). Generally, though, it denotes the "philosophy which motivates
judges to depart from strict adherence to judicial precedent in favor or [sic] pro" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 760 (5th ed. 1979).
gressive and new social policies ..
68 State v. South Amboy Trust Co., 46 N.J. Super. 497, 516, 135 A.2d 38, 49
(Law Div. 1957).
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courts brought similar backgrounds to the bench,"'" but prior service as a chief executive was rare among chiefjustices. Hughes
shared this distinction with William Howard Taft, who had
served as President of the United States from 1909-19137 prior to
leading the United States Supreme Court in the 1920's. 0
In heading both the executive and judicial branches of the
same government, Hughes joined a very select group. It seemed
unlikely, however, that he would ever be in a position to do so.
In 1961, when a divided Democratic Party selected him as a compromise candidate for governor, the nomination did not look like
much of a prize. Practically everyone expected the Republican
nominee, James P. Mitchell, a former Secretary of Labor in the
Eisenhower administration, to win the election. Hughes himself
stated that his fellow Democrats "were casting around for a lamb
to lead to the slaughter. ' ' 7' The underdog, however, campaigned
eighteen hours a day and surprisingly emerged victorious in an
extremely close election, defeating Mitchell "by about 34,000
votes of about 3 million cast."' 72 Hughes later acknowledged that

"iI]t was a pretty tight

fit."' 7 3

During his inauguration, Secretary

of State Edward J. Patten handed the ceremonial seal of the state
to the new governor and announced facetiously, "I confer upon
74
you the great steal of the State of New Jersey.
Once Hughes obtained executive power, he exercised it very
effectively. 75 His administration championed liberal policies such
as tax reform, pollution control, urban aid, gun control, and increased state funding for higher education. Hughes enjoyed considerable success in persuading both Democratic legislators and
their Republican counterparts to support these programs. 7 He
easily won a second four year term in 1965. His opponent was
Republican State Senator Wayne Dumont. Governor Hughes recalled, "I knocked Dumont's brains out."' 77 His victory margin of
69 During the period 1961-1968, seven former governors served on American
state supreme courts. Canon, supra note 9, at 41.
70 See A. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, CHIEF JUSTICE 55-58 (1965).
71 Sederis, supra note 5, at 14.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1978, § II, at 19, col. 5 (emphasis added).
75 One author has stated "[w]hen RichardJ. Hughes left the New Jersey Governor's office in 1970, he was widely regarded as one of the best chief executives in
the state's history." Sullivan, Hughes in Retrospect: A Public Life, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5,
1979, § XI, at 1, col. 3.
76 Id. at 11, col. 1.
77 Sederis, supra note 5, at 15.
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350,000 votes was, at the time, "the largest plurality in New
7

Jersey's history."

1

Although studded with such successes as his 1965 re-election victory, Hughes's governorship also included frustrations
and failures. During his first term, he often found himself at
odds with a Republican-controlled legislature. In November
1963, the voters rejected the governor's proposed $750 million
capital construction bond referendum. In addition, fourteen of
Hughes's Democratic supporters were voted out of the legislature. 79 During his second term, Newark exploded in one of the

worst urban ghetto riots of the 1960's. 80 There were also scandals. Some of the Democratic leaders who had hand-picked
Hughes for the governorship, together with several of his closest
cabinet aides, were convicted on corruption charges. 8 As New
York Times writer Ronald Sullivan reported in 1979, "[t]he political scandal [gave] New Jersey a bad name and undermine[d] Mr.
Hughes's accomplishments. "82
Undoubtedly, however, Hughes's accomplishments as governor were substantial. Many of his achievements involved the
New Jersey courts. Even while heading the executive branch,
Hughes continued to exhibit great interest in the judiciary. Concerned about the backlog of cases developing in the courts, the
Governor pressed the legislature to increase the number of superior court judges. The legislature complied, although it authorized fewer new positions than the governor thought necessary. 8 1
Hughes also built and shaped the judicial branch through
the use of his appointment power. In March 1964, he reappointed both Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub and Associate Justice John J. Francis to the New Jersey Supreme Court, thus
conferring life tenure on those two distinguished jurists.84 On
September 12, 1966, Hughes nominated twenty judges to the superior court and twenty-two more to other benches across the
state. One writer noted that these appointments constituted "the
78

Id.

79 Id. at 14.

80 See Sullivan, supra note 75, at 11, col. 1. Twenty-six people were killed in the
Newark riot, and another 1200 were injured. M. VIORST, FIRE IN THE STREETS 412
(1979). The Detroit riot, which occurred during the summer of 1967, left 43 people dead and 7200 arrested. Id. The August 1965 Watts riot in the Los Angeles
area resulted in 34 deaths. Id. at 311.
81 Sullivan, supra note 75, at 11, col. 1.
82 Id.
83 See N.Y. Times, May 19, 1964, at 31, col. 4.
84 Id., March 20, 1964, at 23, col. 5.
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largest package of judicial nominations in New Jersey's history."" Perhaps the best indication of how important this chief
executive considered judicial appointments is the fact that, in August 1964, he called the state senate into special session, for the
first time in his administration, because it had adjourned without
acting on thirteen nominations that he considered urgent.8 6
II.

NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT

While governor, Hughes strived to improve a judicial branch
which he would eventually head. At the completion of his second
term though, he returned to the private practice of law.8 7
Hughes noted of his decision "It]here were still children to educate, bank loans to be paid and a great deal of money to be made
as a lawyer." '8 8 His wife, Betty, and numerous friends urged him
to be content with his past governmental achievements. In 1973,
however, the former governor returned to public life as chiefjustice of the New Jersey Supreme Court.8 9
Hughes's chief justiceship descended on him like a lightening bolt from the sky. In April 1973, Governor William T. Cahill
named fellow Republican, Pierre Garven, to succeed Joseph
Weintraub as chiefjustice. In October of the same year, Garven,
who took office in August, died suddenly of a stroke. At the time
of his death, New Jersey was in the midst of an election campaign. Cahill wanted to replace Garven with another Republican,
Associate Justice Morris Pashman, but abandoned the idea because a Pashman nomination threatened to touch off a bitter confirmation fight. On election day, New Jersey voters handed
control of the state senate to the Democrats, and also elected a
Democratic governor, Brendan T. Byrne. If Cahill had named a
Republican as chief justice of the supreme court, the GOP could
85 Id., Sept. 13, 1966, at 34, col. 2.
86 Id., Aug. 19, 1964, at 26, col. 8. When he called the senate into special ses-

sion, Hughes denounced Republican Minority Leader William E. Ozzard, who was
also chairman of the Judiciary Committee, for failing to act on the appointments.
Id. On September 6, the Senate assembled for two and one-half minutes, then adjourned until November 16, without confirming the judicial nominations. Id., Sept.

2, 1964, at 27, col. 6. There was also a constitutional dimension to the conflict
between Hughes and the senate. As one author noted, "[t]he Senators say Gov.
RichardJ. Hughes wants their consent without seeking their advice and Mr. Hughes
contends that the power of appointment rests solely with him, subject to confirmation by the Senate." Id.
87 Sederis, supra note 5, at 16. Hughes was succeeded by Republican William T.
Cahill. Id.
88 Sullivan, supra note 75, at 1, col. 3.
89 Id.
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have been charged with stealing the position. The chief justice
would have been nominated by a lame duck Republican governor
and confirmed by a lame duck Republican senate. Departing
from a New Jersey tradition, under which governors always used
their appointment power to keep the seven member court balanced four to three in favor of their party, Cahill, after consulting
with Byrne, gave the Democrats a majority by nominating his
close and personal friend, former Governor Hughes. 90 Hughes
noted later, "[w]hen Cahill dropped the bombshell, nobody
would believe it." 9 ' The former governor further noted, "[i]t
was amazing. The Governor had never appointed a member of
the opposite party to be chief justice-never in history."9 2 Nor
had any former New Jersey governor
ever been nominated to
93
head the state supreme court.

Although unexpected, Cahill's choice met with widespread
approval. 94 Besides the obvious political reasons, Hughes's background was also important. Traditionally, those selected for service on the New Jersey Supreme Court were experienced public
servants, who had held two or more other offices before their
appointment. 95 Hughes fit that mold. Praising the nomination,
the New York Times noted that Cahill was returning to government
a man whose broad background included not only the governorship but prior service as a jurist. 96 Cahill expected his predecessor to be a "cohesive force" who could provide the supreme
court with the sort of leadership it needed. Furthermore, while
Hughes possessed the sense of social awareness Cahill wanted in
90 N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 97, cols. 6-8, at 99, cols. 1-3. Cahill's appointment of Hughes supports the contention of Professor Henry Robert Glick that in
NewJersey the channels for recruitment of supreme court justices are open largely
to those with extensive political backgrounds and links to other political actors. H.
GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS 138 (1971).
For Hughes, the appointment rectified a wrong which had been done to him in
the late 1950's. While he was serving on the appellate division, Democratic Governor Robert B. Meyner had passed over him in filling supreme court vacancies. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at 99, col. 3.
91 Sederis, supra note 5, at 16.
92

Id.

Editor's Note, supra note 4, at 7. It should be noted, though, that New Jersey
judges interviewed by Robert Glick several years before the Hughes appointment
reported that New Jersey had an informal bipartisan tradition under which Democrats and Republicans were appointed alternately to the supreme court, regardless
of which party controlled the governorship at the time. H. GLICK, supra note 90, at
95.
94 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1973, at 40, cols. 1-2.
95 See H. GLICK, supra note 90, at 138.
96 N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1973, at 40, cols. 1-2.
93
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a chief justice, "Cahill was said to feel that Mr. Hughes's eight
years as Governor would bring to the court the practical experiences gained from enforcing laws interpreted by a branch of the
state government many critics believe is too removed from the
reality that must be faced by Governors and Legislatures." 9 7
III.

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR

The fact that Hughes was a seasoned administrator certainly
contributed immensely to his success on the supreme court
bench. Like his fellow former chief executive, William Howard
Taft,9 8 Richard J. Hughes recorded his most impressive achievements as a judicial manager and as a reformer of the administration of justice. He worked diligently to increase the unity,
efficiency, and output of the New Jersey judiciary.
A.

Hughes and the Administration ofJustice

Hughes considered the administration of the judicial system
to be one of his most important duties.9 9 His colleague, Morris
Pashman, who himself nearly became chief justice, rated Hughes
"a great administrator."' 0 0 Generally, Hughes did not attempt
to
mass his court, which seldom spoke with one voice. Loath to
offend anyone, he preserved excellent personal relations with his
associates. During his days in Mercer County politics, his tolerance of incompatible views and his ability to mediate disputes
had earned Hughes a reputation as a man who could carry water
on both shoulders without spilling a drop, and hence the nickname "Two Buckets."' 0 ' Some of Hughes's judicial associates,
however, believed that this trait was an unfortunate quality for a
chief justice. In their opinion, "Two Buckets" was often less decisive and forthright than his role as chief justice required. 0 2
97 Id., Nov. 8, 1973, at 99, cols. 1-2.

98 With the objective of improving the efficiency of the federal judiciary, Chief

Justice Taft labored relentlessly to secure congressional enactment of legislation
that would enable the United States Supreme Court to reduce its burdensome
caseload and the congestion of its docket by making its jurisdiction discretionary.
A. MASON, supra note 70, at 107-14. On February 13, 1925, Congress enacted legislation accommodating Taft's pleas by greatly expanding use of writ of certiorari.
Id.
99 Editor's Note, supra note 4, at 8.

10 Sullivan, supra note 75, at 1, col. 5.

1(l Id., at 1, col. 6.
102 Id., at 1, cols. 5-6 ("One criticism of Justice Hughes ... involved his reluc-

tance to be judgmental, a trait that often saved him from making political enemies
when he was Governor.").
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Conversely, other officials and commentators praised Hughes's
°3
ability to move his court toward compromise and resolution. 1
His efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
judicial system earned him more praise. As Chief Justice,
Hughes proved to be a worthy successor to Arthur T. Vanderbilt.
Prior to becoming the state's chiefjustice in the late 1940's, Vanderbilt had campaigned relentlessly to improve the efficiency of
New Jersey's courts and had played a major role in shaping the
judicial provisions of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution. °4 The
judicial article designated the chief justice as the administrative
head of all New Jersey courts, and empowered him to appoint an
administrative director to assist in managing the unified system. ' 5 The judicial article also empowered the chief justice to
assign judges to the various divisions and parts of the superior
court.'1 6 As the first chief justice under the new constitution,
Vanderbilt exploited its potential to the fullest, introducing businesslike organization and methods into the New Jersey judiciary.
He required lower court judges to file reports detailing the
number of hours devoted to various activities and spelling out
how rapidly they were disposing of cases. Vanderbilt then rearranged judicial personnel, assigning each jurist to the duties for
which he seemed best suited. He also sought to eliminate weak
cases and to ease docket congestion by stressing the use of pretrial conferences. Although resented by some judges, Vanderbilt's methods proved extremely effective, giving New Jersey a
0 7
streamlined and efficient court system.1
Hughes both adopted and extended the methods initiated by
Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1979, § IV, at 6, col. 3.
In the early 1930's Vanderbilt served on the New Jersey Judicial Council. A.
VANDERBILT, II, CHANGING LAW 84 (1976). The Council developed a plan for fundamental court reform, but implementation of its ideas would have required
amending the state constitution, which could not be accomplished. Id. at 85-86.
For almost 18 years, Vanderbilt continued to work for a streamlined and businesslike court system. Id. at 88. In 1947, New Jersey held a convention to revise its
constitution, and adopted a judicial article which embodied all of the major proposals that the New Jersey Judicial Council had advanced between 1930 and 1940. Id.
at 162. Having greatly influenced the design of the state's new judicial system,
Vanderbilt then played the crucial role in putting it into operation, serving as the
first chief justice of the new New Jersey Supreme Court and successfully implementing the many innovative features of the judicial article. See id. at 169-227; see
generally Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Evohtion of State Supreme
Courts, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 961, 981-82 (1978) (discussing Vanderbilt's leadership in
making New Jersey's court system distinguished and innovative).
105 N.J. CONST., art. 6, § 7,
1.
103
104

I((

Id. at

107

See A.

2.
VANDERBILT,

supra note 104, at 175-87.
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Vanderbilt. He sought to monopolize and to make more stringent the supervision of the New Jersey judiciary by the chief justice and the supreme court. For example, when a state senate
committee questioned jurists who had been reappointed about
their official actions, Hughes complained vigorously. °8 He objected that matters of judicial conduct should be addressed only
to the court system, which had its own mechanism for discipliningjudges.' °9 In 1974, Hughes created the Advisory Committee
on Judicial Conduct, under the leadership of retired Justice John
J. Francis, and charged it with monitoring judicial integrity and
investigating reports of judicial misconduct." 0 In February
1977, acting on the committee's recommendation, the New
Jersey Supreme Court removed from office a Jersey City municipal judge, who repeatedly had engaged in bizarre behavior and
been abusive of the rights of criminal defendants and their attorneys."1 ' Writing for the court in this expulsion case, ChiefJustice
Hughes declared, "[a]n intoxication with judicial power which
would ignore basic constitutional precepts is a wholly unaccept-2
able syndrome that cannot be tolerated in NewJersey courts.""l
Hughes and his colleagues found the Jersey City judge guilty of
incompetence, unfitness, and3 misconduct in office. They expelled him from the bench."
Chief Justice Hughes labored not only to keep standards of
judicial behavior high but also to keep the courts out of politics
and politics out of the courts. This effort involved more than just
combatting attempts by the state senate to subject judges to
political inquisitions. In 1961, the New Jersey Supreme Court
had adopted a rule prohibiting all lower court personnel from
engaging in partisan political activity." 4 In 1962, the Administrative Director extended this prohibition to include judicial
spouses. 1 5 When, in 1973, the wife of a Weehawken Superior
Court judge announced she planned to run for a seat on the local
school board, Hughes reaffirmed the rule. It was, he declared,
necessary to safeguard the courts from even the slightest appear108 N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1978, at 84, col. 3-4; N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1978, § XI, at
3, col. 2-3.
109 Id., Apr. 18, 1978, at 84, col. 3.
110 Hughes, State of the Judiciary Address, N.J.L.J., Dec. 8, 1977, at 15, col. 3.
I'' See In re Yengo, 72 N.J. 425, 371 A.2d 41 (1977).
112 Id. at 450, 371 A.2d at 57.
'13 Id. at 451, 371 A.2d at 57.
114 H. GLICK, supra note 90, at 62-63.
''5 See generally In re Gaulkin, 69 N.J. 185, 190 n.1, 351 A.2d 740, 742 n.1 (1976).

1987]

CHIEFJUSTICE HUGHES

ance of partiality.' 16 Later, however, the supreme court ruled
unanimously that the prohibition on political activity did not extend to judges' spouses." 7 Apparently persuaded that the increasing social and legal autonomy of married women rendered
the old rule unrealistic, Hughes joined, and even spoke for, the
majority. He announced, though, that the court would remain
alert for even the slightest hint of political activity by judges

themselves." 8 It was, Hughes wrote, "determined that every
protection shall be taken to assure that the judiciary itself shall
continue its careful separation from direct or indirect involvement in politics.'

1

Under Hughes's leadership, the supreme court kept a careful
eye not only on the conduct of judges but on lawyers as well. In
December 1971, the court adopted a rule establishing a graduated schedule of maximum contingent fees that plaintiff's attorneys might charge in tort cases. 120 When the American Trial
Lawyers Association challenged this rule, the court, speaking
through Hughes, reaffirmed it.' 2 ' The chief justice was also determined to assure the public that improper and unethical conduct by New Jersey attorneys would be exposed and punished.
Both Hughes and the court sought to promote reforms in ethics
116 N.Y. Times,Jan. 5, 1974, at 60, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1975, at 33, col. 2.

See Gaulkin, 69 N.J. at 197, 351 A.2d at 746 (1976).
118 See id. at 191-92, 351 A.2d at 743-44.
''9 Id. at 199, 351 A.2d at 747.
120 N.J. Ct. R. 1:21-7(c) provided as follows:
(c) In any matter where a client's claim for damages is based upon
the alleged tortious conduct of another, including products liability
claims, and the client is not a subrogee, an attorney shall not contract
for, charge, or collect a contingent fee in excess of the following limits:
(1) 50% on the first $1000 recovered;
(2) 40% on the next $2000 recovered;
(3) 33-1/3% on the next $47,000 recovered;
(4) 20% on the next $50,000 recovered;
(5) 10% on any amount recovered over $100,000; and
(6) where the amount recovered is for the benefit of an infant or
incompetent and the matter is settled without trial the foregoing limits
shall apply, except that the fee on any amount recovered up to $50,000
shall not exceed 25%.
117

RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 57-58 (1972).

121 American Trial Lawyers Ass'n. v. N.J. Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d
350 (1974). In his opinion, Hughes stated:
Since 1948... the Supreme Court has not hesitated to meet its responsibility for the use of the judicial and administrative power reposed in it
by Article VI. Thus, it has "legislatively" adopted Rules of general application regulating the professional conduct of attorneys and their relationships to their clients and to the courts.
Id. at 263, 330 A.2d at 353.
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proceedings that would eliminate even the appearance that law22
yers were not being critical enough in policing themselves.
B.

Crusadingfor More and Better-PaidJudges

Besides endeavoring to protect the image and integrity of
the bench and bar, Chief Justice Hughes, like Vanderbilt before
him, labored to increase judicial efficiency and productivity.
Hughes recognized that, with the volume of litigation increasing
rapidly, the key to achieving swift disposition of cases was having
a sufficient number of high-quality judges. In February 1975,
with the support of the chief justice, the legislature enacted, and
Governor Byrne signed, 2 ' legislation allowing retired judges to
fill judicial vacancies temporarily by serving beyond the
mandatory retirement age of seventy.' 24 This was only a temporary solution to the problem. When, in the following year, Governor Byrne called for speedier trials, Hughes responded that
two measures were needed to eliminate the 140,897 case backlog
then clogging New Jersey's courts. The first step was for the governor to fill judicial vacancies promptly. The second proposal
Hughes urged was the creation of additional judgeships. The
chief justice asserted that speedier trials in criminal cases might
be possible without expanding the judiciary, but launching a successful assault on the civil backlog would be impossible without
more judges. The cost of what he was urging, Hughes said,
would be $18 million. Pointing out that the governor had cut $4
million from the previous year's judicial budget, the chiefjustice
informed Byrne bluntly that he could not have an improved judiciary while continuing to insist on tightfisted economizing.125
Hughes realized that "budget support is indispensable to the ad26
ministration of justice." 1
The chiefjustice continued to lobby for the filling ofjudicial
vacancies and for adequate funding to properly staff the courts.
122 Sullivan, Hughes Rides Herd on Lawyer Ethics, N.Y. Times,Jan. 16, 1977, § 11, at
11, col. 1. The reforms which Chief Justice Hughes sought included regionalization of the existing county ethics committees; requiring at least one member of the
reconstituted ethics committees to be appointed from outside the legal profession;
and creation of a new ethics review panel to serve as a "court of appeal" between
the regional committees and the supreme court. Id.
123 N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1975, at 48, col. 7-8.
''4 Act approved Feb. 14, 1975, 1975 N.J. Laws ch. 14.
125 In a letter to Governor Byrne, Hughes emphasized the need to fill judicial
vacancies and provide the courts with increased funding. See N.Y. Tiies, jan. 25,
1976, § XI, at 30, col. 7; N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1976, at 73, col. 2.
126 Hughes, snpra note 110, at 19, col. 2.

1987]

CHIEFJUSTICE HUGHES

In December 1976, he publicly endorsed a bill to give NewJersey
judges across-the-board pay raises of $6000 per year. ' 27 Hughes
urged passage of the bill "[t]o preserve the finest judiciary in the
nation and . . . to serve the public interest in the swift and effi-

cient administration of criminal and civil justice....,1,28

Despite

his insistence that the courts were confronting an "attrition crisis," with talented jurists leaving the bench because their pay was
not keeping pace with inflation, Democratic legislative leaders
shelved the salary increase measure until after the November
29
1977 elections.
Hughes continued to press for higher pay for judges in an
address on the "State of the Judiciary" which he delivered orally
to the legislature less than a month after the election. 3 0 At that
point, the chief justice was seeking raises of $12,500.13
A
number of legislators raised their eyebrows when they heard this
request.
But when he warned them to act before the new Legislature
convened on Jan. 10 because existing laws precluded a member of the Legislature from being appointed to a judicial post
for which the salary had been increased during his term of office, there were smiles and elbow jabs in the ribs. They had
127 In January 1977, both Hughes and Arthur J. Simpson, Jr., the Administrative
Director of the NewJersey Courts, urged filling a number of then existing vacancies
on the bench as one step toward reducing the caseload backlog. N.Y. Times,Jan. 6,
1977, at 63, col. 2.
128 Id., Dec. 7, 1976, at 87, col. 2.
129 Sullivan, RaiseforJudges Stalls in Legislature, N.Y. Times,June 12, 1977, § XI, at
1, col. 5. Hughes subsequently pointed out that, besides making it difficult to retain
judges already on the bench, low judicial salaries made it increasingly difficult to
find suitable candidates for vacant judgeships. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1977, at 49, col.
1.
130 Hughes, supra note 110, at 15. The speech that was delivered on November
21, 1977 has been described by Justice Mark A. Sullivan as "a bench mark in establishing that vital link between the Judicial branch and the Executive and Legislative
branches of our state government." Sullivan, supra note 4, at 107-08. This was the
first "State of the judiciary" message to be personally delivered to ajoint session of
the legislature. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1977, § XI, at 6, col. 4. Hughes had been
invited a year and one-half earlier, however, by the president of the state senate,
Matthew Feldman, to address a joint session of the legislature on the state of the
judiciary. Id., Apr. 13, 1976, at 71, col. 8. At the time Hughes spoke, NewJersey
ranked eleventh in the nation in level ofjudicial salaries, although it was second in
per capita income. Hughes, supra note 110, at 19, col. 2. Before his address.
Hughes's wife complained publically about the inadequacy of her husband's salary,
which had not kept pace with the inflation of living costs, such as food and college
tuition. "I'm not alone," she said. "We're all in the same boat." Narvaez, Byrne
Receives Ova/ionfiom Legislators, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1977. at 79, col. 2.
13 1 Hughes, supra note 110, at 19, col. 4.
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32

got the message. 1
A week later Democratic and Republican legislative leaders agreed
Byrne to seek $8000 raises for each of
in a meeting with Governor
1 33
the state's 312 judges.
In his address to the legislature, Hughes requested more personnel as well as higher salaries. He asked the legislature to authorize 202 new positions in the court system. Such action was
necessary, the chief justice insisted, in order to eliminate the backlog of cases. 134 Hughes pointed out that, while the number of
judges had increased five times since the state's new court system
began operation in 1948, the judiciary's "responsibilities are almost
fourteen times greater." 135 Since 1973, the per capita work product
of New Jersey jurists had increased from 1700 to 2000 cases per
health
year.1 36 The chiefjustice told the legislature, "I have seen ' the
37
of judges fail by the intensity of their devotion to duty."'
C.

ImprovingJudicial Efficiency

While lobbying for more judges, Hughes also endeavored to
improve the performance of those already on the bench. In his
1977 address to the legislature, the chief justice pointed with
pride to the recent establishment of the New Jersey Judicial College. 1 38 He told legislators, "[flor several days prior to the commencement of each new court year all judges in the state system
participate in very intensive courses, lectures and discussion on
every judicial problem from equity to criminal sentencing." 139
Furthermore, Hughes reported, the Administrative Office of the
Courts was arranging mini-seminars to educate judges on timely
subjects. 140 In addition to going to school, New Jersey jurists received report cards. In December 1978, Hughes announced that
the performance of all judges would be reviewed and rated by the
court system itself. 141
Narvaez, supra note 130, at 79, col. 3.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1977, at 77, col. 4.
134 Hughes, supra, note 110, at 19, col. 1. Hughes did not specify how many of
the requested positions would be judgeships. See id. He did indicate that 23 of
them were judicial posts in the chancery division whose creation was mandated by
statute. Id.
1'35 Id. at 15, col. 2.
132
133

136
137

Id. at col. 3.

138

Id. at 16, col. 2.

139

Id.

140

Id.

Id.

141 N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
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His initiative to improve judicial efficiency included a campaign to expedite the flow of appeals through the appellate division and the supreme court. He endeavored to reduce the
volume of litigation in those courts by limiting opportunities for
appeal. For example, Hughes announced that jury damage
awards might not be overturned unless they were so disproportionate as to shock the conscience. 4 2 The chief justice also admonished other appellate judges to uphold trial courts' damage
awards unless they were clearly insupportable. 4a3 Hughes further indicated his desire to reduce the number of appeals
through a decision restricting the power of appellate courts to
overrule the determinations of legislatively created commissions 144 and through an opinion emphasizing that criminal
sentences might be modified on appeal only where there was a
clear showing of abuse of discretion. 45 In September 1978, the
chiefjustice set up the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on
Appellate Practice, which was charged with devising solutions to
14 6
the problem of crowded calendars in the appellate division.
After the creation of this committee, the backlog of cases awaiting appellate review declined drastically. Its success inspired
Hughes to create a similar body to eliminate delays in the adjudi47
cation of matrimonial matters. 1
The chiefjustice also attempted to accelerate the disposition
of criminal cases in the trial courts. After Governor Byrne's January 1976 call for speedy processing of serious offenders by the
judicial system, Hughes ordered a statewide survey to determine
what additional resources would be required to achieve that objective. This study, completed on April 14, 1976, proposed a
four year phase-in program to accomplish "speedy trial
goals. ' "141 "Unfortunately," in November 1977, the chief justice
explained that "due to various financial hardships facing the
State in the interim, the resources for this ambitious program
142 See Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 366, 396 A.2d 561, 566 (1979): Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84, 323 A.2d 495, 500
(1974).
14:1 See Leimgruber v. Claridge Assoc., Ltd., 73 N.J. 450, 455-56, 375 A.2d 652,
655 (1977).
144 Editor's Note, supra note 4, at 9 (citing Nicoletta v. North Jersey Dist. Water
Supply Comm'n, 77 N.J. 145, 166, 390 A.2d 90, 101 (1978)).
145 Id. (citing State v. Velazquez, 54 N:J. 493, 495, 257 A.2d 97, 98 (1969)).
1441 Pashman, supra note 2, at 89.
147 1&
148

Hughes, supra note 110, at 15, col. 2.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

were never provided."''

49

[Vol. 17:4

Even without the necessary financial

support, Hughes continued to pursue the speedy trial goal.151' In

several vicinages, prosecutors, public defenders, and judges embarked on cooperative efforts to ensure that those charged with
violent crimes would be indicted within forty-five
days of their
51
arrest and brought to trial within sixty days.'
While supporting these undertakings, Hughes also promoted greater use of pre-trial intervention for first time offenders
charged with nonviolent crimes. These defendants were placed
in training programs, afforded access to drug and alcohol detoxification programs, and given professional counseling. If these
rehabilitative measures proved successful, prosecution was
dropped, thus enabling the offenders to avoid acquiring criminal
records. This innovation was part of a "wave of reform," whose
primary purpose was rehabilitation.' 5 2 In addition, Hughes explained, "[b]y removing such marginal offenders from further
53
prosecution, pressures on the criminal calendars are relieved."1
Thus, pre-trial intervention was part of Hughes's ongoing
campaign to eliminate the backlog of cases clogging New Jersey's
courts and to provide the state with speedy and efficient justice.
His crusade produced positive results. In August 1979, Chief
Justice Hughes reported "that for the first time in five years, the
' 54
state court system disposed of more cases than were initiated."'
D.

Unifying New Jersey's Courts

ChiefJustice Vanderbilt would have applauded this achievement, but probably would have appreciated even more another
of Hughes's accomplishments: the merging of New Jersey's
county courts into the superior court. Vanderbilt and Governor
Alfred E. Driscoll had tried to get the 1947 New Jersey Constitutional Convention to create a fully integrated court system, only
to be thwarted by the Hudson County delegation, which persuaded representatives of small counties to back a plan to carve a
separate county court system out of the proposed superior
court.' 5 5 The resultant judicial article allowed a non-unified
149)

Id.

15o
151

Id.

152

See id. at 17, col. 2.

153

Id.

154

N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1979, § II, at 2, col. 2.
Clapp, supra note 4, at 18; A. VANDERBILT, supra note 104, at 160-61.

155

Id.
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court system to persist from 1948 to 1978.156
On March 25, 1977, Chief Justice Hughes appeared before
the Assembly Judiciary Committee to urge that New Jersey complete the job of creating a fully unified court system.' 57 Hughes
testified that "[t]he general purposes of unification are to eliminate overlapping and fragmented jurisdictions, to increase judicial efficiency and economy and to afford equality for all full-time
state court trial judges .... ,1158 The chiefjustice contended that
increasing case loads mandated the county courts be combined
with the superior court. A resolution to amend the constitution
to bring about that objective passed the assembly in 1977, only to
die in the senate. 15 9 Hughes, however, refused to abandon his
fight.' 6 ° In March 1978, he appeared before the New Jersey Assembly Judiciary Committee to again advocate the merger of the
county courts into the superior court. In addition, Hughes enlisted the League of Women Voters in the fight for the required
constitutional amendment, and spoke in support of his proposal
before the General Council of the New Jersey Bar Association,
several county bar groups, the New Jersey Press Association, and
other organizations.' 6 ' Finally, his labors were rewarded. Both
the legislature and the voters adopted the constitutional amendment, and on December 12, 1978, New Jersey at last acquired a
fully unified court system. 6 2 This long delayed realization of
Vanderbilt's dream was "perhaps the greatest accomplishment"
gracing the impressive record which Chief Justice Hughes com63
piled as a judicial administrator and administrative reformer.
IV.

JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

In that respect, his career on the supreme court resembled
that of William Howard Taft, who also earned a reputation as an
outstanding chief justice primarily because of his accomplish156
157
158
159
I (io

Clapp, supra note 4, at 18.
See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 109.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1977, at 51, col. 3.
See Clapp, supra note 4, at 16.
Id.

161 Id.
162 Id. at 18. Having merged the county courts into the superior court, Hughes
immediately set out to create a family part of the superior court. Id. As he conceived it, "[sluch a part would handle not only the matrimonial business of the
superior court, but the business of the juvenile and domestic relations courts establishcd in twenty-one counties." Id.
1 3 Sullivan, supra note 4, at 109.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17:4

ments as an administrative reformer. 1 64 Taft, however, was a
conservative, animated by a strong desire to protect private property from political majorities. 16 5 Hughes, on the other hand, was
deeply committed to New Deal-Great Society liberalism." 6
Although poles apart politically, the ex-governor and the former
President had one thing in common as judges: judicial activism. 16 7 What Hughes shared with his famous federal counterpart
was not a political philosophy but a willingness to use judicial
power to promote his own vision of a good society.
A.

Hughes's Activism and Other Elements of
Hughes'sJudicial Philosophy

Activism was not the only distinguishing characteristic of
Hughes's supreme court opinions; they revealed that he remained a proponent of law and order. Five of the twelve opinions Hughes authored in criminal law or procedure cases
supported rulings in favor of the defendant, ' 6 and another was a
pro-defense dissent.' 69 In two of these cases, however, Hughes
took pro-law enforcement positions on major issues before the
court.170 In a third, he wrote a separate opinion to emphasize his
164

1 W.

SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

273-

76 (1969).
165 See A. MASON, supra note 70, at 15, 60-61, 63-64, 240-42.
166 See, Editor's Note, supra note 4, at 7.
167 See A. MASON, supra note 70, at 59 (discussing Taft's activism).
'68 See, State v. Cohen, 73 N.J. 331, 375 A.2d 259 (1977); State v. Christener, 71
N.J. 55, 74, 362 A.2d 1153, 1163 (1976) (concurring opinion); State v. Harris, 70
N.J. 586, 362 A.2d 32 (1976); In re D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 361 A.2d 513 (1976); State
v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 358 A.2d 163 (1976).
16 See State v. Vinegra, 73 N.J. 484, 494, 376 A.2d 150, 155 (1977) (dissenting
opinion).
170 In State v. Cohen, 73 N.J. 331, 375 A.2d 259 (1977), the court, while affirming
a trial court's motion to suppress evidence which Port Authority police officers had
seized in a warrentless search of the defendant's automobile, reversed an appellate
division ruling that the Port Authority police lacked jurisdiction anywhere but on or
in bridges, tunnels, plazas, and the approaches thereto. According to the chiefjustice, the court certified the case because "we were concerned with the basis on
which the Appellate Division had affirmed." Id. at 333, 375 A.2d at 260. Speaking
through him, the court held that the jurisdiction of the Port Authority police extended to "the whole territorial area of the Port District itself." Id. at 342-43, 375
A.2d at 264.
In In re D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 361 A.2d 513 (1976), a juvenile who had been
found guilty of breaking and entering and theft, adjudged a juvenile delinquent
after entering a plea of guilty, and sentenced to probation, objected to the fact that
the Middlesex County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court had conditioned its
grant of probation on his making restitution to the victim. The supreme court, not

satisfied with the way the case had been handled procedurally, remanded it "for reestablishment of the restitution amount upon which appellant's probation was con-
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belief that a man should have a right to defend himself in his own
home.' 7 ' A fourth case posed a conflict between rehabilitation
and the particular punishment imposed by the trial court in a
criminal case, and Hughes opted for the former. 7 2 There was
far less ambiguity in the opinions he wrote to endorse the upholding of convictions. These were forceful expressions of the
attitudes he had revealed on the Mercer County and superior
court benches. 73 Speaking for the supreme court in overruling
an appellate division decision reducing the sentence of a man
convicted of rape and robbery, Hughes observed rather critically,
As bearing upon its ultimate conclusion that the sentence was
unduly harsh and punitive and that "justice will be best accomplished by some modification," we discern no reference by the
Appellate Division to the protection of the community from
violence, to concern for the unfortunate victims, to the purpose of deterrence of others, to the dim prospect of rehabilitation of the defendant....
Concern about violent crime in urban areas and "the surfeit of hand
guns which is its primary co-efficient"' 7 5 caused Hughes to effectuate what a student commentator called "[a]n unfortunate extension
ditioned .... Id. at 509, 361 A.2d at 524. Hughes pointed out, however, that the
supreme court granted certification mainly to determine whether the Middlesex
CountyJuvenile and Domestic Court had authority to attach a condition of restitution to a probationary term granted to ajuvenile offender. Id. at 493, 361 A.2d at
515. On that issue, the court, with the chiefjustice as its spokesman, ruled for the
state. Id. at 498, 361 A.2d at 518.
171 See State v. Christener, 71 N.J. 55, 74, 362 A.2d 1153, 1163 (1976) (concurring opinion).
172 State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 594-96, 362 A.2d 32, 36-38 (1976). In Hamris, the
defendant had been convicted of welfare fraud and was granted probation, conditional upon her making restitution to the welfare board. Id. at 590, 362 A.2d at 33.
The supreme court affirmed the appellate division's reversal of the restitution requirement. Id. at 599, 362 A.2d at 37. Commenting on this attempt to employ
restitution to deter welfare fraud, Hughes said that "considering the offiender and
her worth to society in struggling to sustain her five children, the human cost of
such deterrence in this instance is too great." Id. at 596, 362 A.2d at 37; cf.,
Pascucci v. Vagott, 71 N.J. 40, 362 A.2d 566 (1976) (invalidating Division of Public
Welfare regulation setting lower level of financial assistance for recipients classified
as "employable" than for those classified as "unemployable").
173 See State v. McCombs, 81 N.J. 373, 408 A.2d 425 (1979); State v. Whitaker, 79
N.J. 503, 401 A.2d 509 (1979); In re H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 381 A.2d 759 (1977); State v.
Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 227, 374 A.2d 20, 30 (1977) (dissenting opinion); State v.
Alston, 70 N.J. 95, 358 A.2d 161 (1976).
174 State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 511, 401 A.2d 509, 513 (1979). Whitaker's
sentence of 43-50 years was reduced by the appellate division to 26-27 years. Id. at
507, 401 A.2d at 511.
175 In re H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 246, 381 A.2d 759, 760 (1977).
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of the power to stop and frisk."' 1 76 In two cases in which the
supreme court held that an armed robber could not be prosecuted
for the murder of a confederate who was killed in a gun battle with
the victim, the chiefjustice recorded solitary dissents. 177 Appropriately, Hughes's tenure on the supreme court ended with an opinion
78
opposing reversal of a criminal conviction.
Off the bench as well as on it, the chiefjustice adopted a decidedly tough posture toward crime and criminals. In April 1976, he
declared publicly that violence could no longer be tolerated.
Hughes promised that "[i]f there is one thing I intend to accomplish
as Chief Justice of New Jersey, it is to devote every resource of the
courts to halt this reign of terror in our streets."'' 79 In furtherance
of this goal, Hughes sought to curtail "excessive judicial
leniency."' 8 0 He persistently urged a toughening of the procedures
for granting bail, so that dangerous criminals would not be returned
to the streets.' 8' As far as the chief justice was concerned, "foremost in the mind of judges [must be] protection of the community
176 See Comment, In re H.B.: An Unfortunate Expansion of the Power to Stop and Frisk,
32 RUT. L. REV. 118 (1979). In In re H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 381 A.2d 759 (1977),
Hughes upheld, over fourth amendment objections, the frisking of a suspect (who
proved to be carrying a gun), based upon an anonymous tip, which was corroborated only as to the suspect's dress, under circumstances where the safety of the
officers and members of the public allegedly required it. See id. at 256-57, 381 A.2d
at 763-64.
177 See State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 227, 374 A.2d 20, 30 (1977) (dissenting opinion); State v. Alston, 73 N.J. 228, 374 A.2d 161 (1977) (dissenting opinion). In
seeking to justify his opposition to the Canola decision, Hughes declared:
"[riesistance whether by victim or police, and even unintended or accidental deaths
which occur in the confused res gestae of violent felony, can hardly be deemed
outside the contemplation of the initiator of such criminal violence." Canola, 73
N.J. at 227, 374 A.2d at 31. In Alston, the chiefjustice simply announced he was
dissenting for the reasons set forth in his dissent in Canola. Alston, 73 N.J. at 229,
374 A.2d at 32 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
178 See State v. McCombs, 81 N.J. 373, 389, 408 A.2d 425, 433 (1979) (dissenting
opinion). In this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed jury selection to proceed while the defendant was unrepresented. The defendant both rejected his assigned counsel and
expressly refused to represent himself. Id. at 374-79, 408 A.2d at 425-28. Hughes
responded, "[w]ith all respect to the views of the majority, the result leaves me with
the uneasy feeling that an adroit and courtwise defendant, in a serious case of alleged criminal violence, has been successful in hoodwinking both trial and appellate courts, to the disadvantage of the true administration of justice." Id. at 390,
408 A.2d at 434 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
179 N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1976, at 71, col. 1.
180

Id.

181 See id., May 5, 1978, § II, at 17, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1975, at 52, col. 3;
N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1975, at 76, col. 7. ChiefJustice Hughes became particularly
agitated about excessive leniency in the bail granting process in May 1978, after a
female legislative aide, Susan Small, was mugged outside the State House in Tren-
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from the clear and present danger of violence."' 2 He insisted that
stiffer sentences ought to be meted out to those convicted of violent
crimes. Hughes further insisted prison terms should be used to prevent harm to the public.' 8 ' He pushed for revision of the plea bargaining process to make it more difficult for recidivists to obtain
light sentences.1 84 In addition, the chiefjustice advocated that juvenile defendants be stripped of the cloak of anonymity, and that the
courts and criminal authorities be permitted to identify those ac5
cused of vandalism.1

8

Although he was a law and order hard-liner, Hughes was, nevertheless, an advocate of prison reform. This warden's son persuaded trial judges to visit the state's correctional facilities to see
first hand the sort of places to which they were sentencing people
and to gain some understanding of the problems faced by the officials who ran them. 18 6 He also sought to improve parole procedures1 8 7 and to eliminate the disparities in sentences that were a
major grievance of prisoners in the penitentiaries.S 8 Hughes firmly
opposed committing young adults to those institutions. 8 9 Indeed,
he insisted that the Trenton facility his father had headed ought to
be closed down entirely and that greater reliance should be placed
on programs that offered an alternative to "the corrupting influence
of prisons."'9° Hughes did stress that these "programs must be

carefully supervised so they do not become a haven for 'the violent
predators who walk our streets.' "19' But he was, despite his outspoken commitment to the eradication of street crime, a genuine
reformer with respect to matters involving the corrections
system. 192
Hughes was also a champion of due process for prisoners. As
Judge Milton B. Conford once observed, "[i]f one were called upon
to identify the single most characteristic aspect of the ChiefJustice's
ton, and a Trenton man was accused of three separate shootings while free on bail.
N.Y. Times, May 5, 1978, § II, at 17, col. 1.
182 Id., Sept. 4, 1975, at 76, col. 7.
183

See id. Apr. 15, 1976, at 71, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1975, at 86, col. 1.

184

Id., Nov. 18, 1975, at 77, col. 6.

190

Id., Sept. 11, 1976, at 51, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1975, at 77, col. 6.
See id., Aug. 11, 1979, at 18, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1975, at 63, col. 2;
Times, Sept. 29, 1975, at 67, col. 2.
See id., Oct. 25, 1975, at 63, col. 2.
See id., Apr. 5, 1974, at 79, col. 1.
See id.
Id., Feb. 24, 1976, at 75, col. 1.
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185
186

N.Y.

187
188
189

While in private practice, Hughes was the chairman of an American Bar Association Committee on Penal Reform. Id., June 24, 1975, at 71, col. 6.
192
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legal philosophy, I believe most would name his penchant for due
process. ' '193 In Avant v. Clifford,' 9 4 a case in which the supreme
court passed on a challenge to prison disciplinary standards promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Institutions and
Agencies, Hughes "demonstrated not only his deep understanding
and appreciation of due process requirements, but at the same time
his insistence that agency action be grounded on fair treatment,
both of the individual and of the public interests."' 19 5 Hughes also
sought to protect the procedural rights of mental patients 19 6 and of
public employees threatened with discharge.' 9 7 Only debtors failed
to elicit his sympathy; he saw no violation of either state or Federal
98
constitutional rights in the Uniform Commercial Code provision'
authorizing a secured creditor to take possession of the collateral
without judicial process.' 99
Hughes's position on this issue suggests a pro-business bias, as
does his opinion in In re Board's Investigation of Telephone Companies.z°°
In that case, the supreme court ruled that New Jersey Bell could
include in its tariffs a comprehensive adjustment clause (CAC),
which would allow the company to raise telephone rates in response
to increases in certain categories of expenses, without obtaining
prior approval from the Board of Public Utility Commissioners. 20 1
The Department of the Public Advocate argued against acceptance
of the CAC, and in a vigorous dissent, Justice Pashman accused the
majority, for which Hughes spoke, of abandoning sound principles
of utility regulation. 0 2 A careful reading of the chiefjustice's opin193 Conford, To ChiefJustice RichardJ. Hughes, 11 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 4, 4-5 (1979).

194 67 N.J. 496, 341 A.2d 629 (1975). See generally, 1974-75 N.J. Supreme Court
Term, Prisoners' Rights-New Jersey Fairnessand Rightness Standard-ProceduralRequirements Delineatedfor Prison Disciplinary Hearings, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 729 (1976) (discussing Avant and related prison disciplinary cases).
195 Milmed, supra note 4, at 81.
196 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1976, § II, at 33, col. 1.
197 See Nicoletta v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 77 N.J. 145, 390
A.2d 90 (1978).
198 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-503 (West 1962).
199 King v. SouthJersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974). Hughes took
the position that the fourteenth amendment had not been violated because it
"erects no shield.., against private action however wrongful ..
" Id. at 174, 330
A.2d at 8. The United States Supreme Court arrived at a similar conclusion with
respect to another creditor self-help remedy in Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149 (1978) (warehouseman's lien). See generally, Note, Self-Help Repossession Does Not
Constitute State Action for Purposesof the Fourteenth Amendment, It Is Not Per Se Unconscionable, Nor Does It Violate the New Jersey Constitution, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 147 (1975).
200 66 N.J. 476, 333 A.2d 4 (1975).
201 Id. at 496, 333 A.2d at 15.
202 Id. at 509, 333 A.2d at 22 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
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ion reveals, however, that In re Board's Investigation hardly represented judicial capitulation to big business.2 °0 3 In another
regulatory case, Hughes set aside an increase in the rate for hauling
sand which the Public Utility Commission had granted to the New
Jersey Central Railroad. 20 4 He also adopted what could be characterized as a pro-consumer position in a case posing the issue of
whether an insurance company that refused to settle a suit against
the insured within the policy limits was liable for the amount of any
excess judgment that might be rendered against him. 0 5
The immediate beneficiaries of the foregoing decisions were
business enterprises, but the opinions which Chief Justice Hughes
wrote in tort cases clearly show that his sympathies lay with people
rather than with corporations. When a trial court required a motorcyclist injured in a collision with a food company's truck to accept a
$150,000 remittitur, Hughes restored the $300,000 jury verdict.20 6
Similarly, when the appellate division overturned a judgment won
by a motorist injured when her car struck a corporation's illegally
parked truck, Hughes reinstated the award.20 7 In another case, he
restored an award of $16,500 assessed against the owners of a giant
apartment complex, whose workmen had crossed plaintiffs' readily
identifiable property line and cut thirty feet off the tops of eleven
Hughes wrote in part:
In a rate proceeding, utility expenses, to be allowable, must bejustified. Good company management is required; honest stewardship is
demanded; diligence is expected; careful, even hard, bargaining in the
marketplace and at the negotiation table is prerequisite. And so it must
be with regard to expenses recaptured by 'flow through' to consumers
by dint of a comprehensive adjustment clause. Tested in the scrutiny of
final rate determination and only in that way (despite the impressive
monitoring devices built into the instant clause) can such expenses be
validated and become demonstrably honest components in the ascertainment of 'just and reasonable' rates. Lacking that validation, certainly and justification, the rates would have been unjustly charged and
to the extent of that injustice must be refunded to the customers. That
protection being provided in unmistakable terms, however, we would
see no reason for this Court to disagree with the PUC adoption and the
continued operation of the comprehensive adjustment clause, pending,
as we say, scrutiny of such expenses in final hearing.
Id. at 495-96, 333 A.2d 14-15. See Note, 6 SETON HALL L. REV 551, 564 (1974)
("This innovative approach to the problem of interim relief adds flexibility to such
devises as CAC and can be an important administrative tool when used to offset
such regulatory problems as 'lag' and 'attrition.' ").
204 In re Intrastate Indus. Sand Rates, 66 N.J. 12, 327 A.2d 427 (1974).
205 Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
206 Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 379 A.2d 225 (1977).
207 Carrino v. Novotny, 78 N.J. 355, 396 A.2d 561 (1979). Hughes took the position that the violation of the parking ordinance could be considered as evidence of
negligence. Id. at 362-64, 396 A.2d at 564-66.
203
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trees in order to create a flight path for helicopters.2
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Activist in Action

Although a determination to eradicate street crime, a commitment to due process, and a concern for those injured by corporate activity were all prominent features of Chief Justice
Hughes's jurisprudence, it was judicial activism that produced
the opinions which earned him a national reputation. The
supreme court which Hughes joined in 1973 had a tradition that
contrasted sharply with the judicial deference and restraint he
had displayed earlier as a Mercer County and superior court
judge. Vanderbilt, Hughes's predecessor, believed that the
supreme court should play a significant role in state policy making.2" 9 Influenced by his views, it did so throughout the 1950's
and 1960's.210 Members of the New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted a posture characteristic of legal realist judges, 2 1' taking
the position that they should be innovative, make recommendations to the legislature, and even formulate public policy themselves.2 12 The New Jersey Supreme Court achieved a national
208 Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., Ltd., 73 N.J. 450, 375 A.2d 652 (1977).
209 Glick & Vines, Law Making in the StateJudiciary: A Comparative Study of the Judi-

cial Role in Four States, 2 POLITY 142, 148 (1969).
210 See id. at 148-49; Friedman, Kagan, Cartwright & Wheeler, State Supreme Courts:
A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 805-06 (1981) [hereinafter Style
and Citation].
211 Style and Citation, supra note 210, at 785. According to Professor Lawrence
Friedman:
Legal realism is the name of a school of legal thought which flourished most notably in the 1930s. The realists argued that judges were
much more independent than they admitted; they sneered at the idea
that the way to decide cases was by logical deduction from pre-existing
cases and rules. Judges in our system make law; they create new policy.
In fact, they cannot help doing so, in certain cases. A realist judge
would be a judge who is aware of outside and inside pressures-aware
of the way they affect his work. He would be sensitive to the impact of
his decisions, that is, their social consequences; and he would be willing
to take these into account.
L. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 85-86 (1984).
212 H. GLICK, supra note 90, at 47. After making in-depth studies of the supreme
courts of four states, Kenneth Vines concluded: "[i]n NewJersey... a majority of
the judges held to the policymaking purpose." Vines, TheJudicial Role in the American States in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 469 (J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus
eds. 1969). He found their attachment to the policy maker role to be quite distinctive. Fifty-seven percent took the position that what distinguished their jobs from
those of lower court judges was that supreme court justices were supposed to have
greater law making power. Id. at 476. A negligible number ofjudges on the other
state supreme courts Vines studied (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana)
took that position. Id. at 477. The "law makers" on the NewJersey Supreme Court
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reputation as a modern legal realist tribunal, committed to innovative law reform and policy making."1 '
Despite the restrained tendencies which Hughes had displayed earlier, he accepted completely the activist values and traditions of his new court. Inspired by the examples of his
predecessors, Vanderbilt and Weintraub, he decided that what
New Jersey needed was "an activist Chief Justice who will set a
tone of progressive change, a man restless for the doing of right,
untiring in the elusive search for justice .... ,2 1 Hughes still
thought that the judiciary should act carefully and deliberately
and that it should avoid interference in the legislative process
whenever possible. Yet, the chief justice believed that, "where a
vacuum exists which is offensive to the Constitution, the courts
are constrained to act in faithfulness to the oath of office [bethe judiciary is, in the last resort, guarantor of the
cause] .
constitutional promise .... ",215 "[W]hile we don't intend to infringe on the other branches of government or abrogate their
roles," Hughes declared at the time of his appointment, "there is
can turn its back on controversial and constituno way the court
' 2 16
issues.
tional
In certain instances, he exhibited a willingness to cooperate
with the legislature. "It goes without saying," Hughes wrote in
White v. Township of North Bergen, 2 17 "that the wisdom, good sense,
policy and prudence (or otherwise) of a statute are matters within
the province of the Legislature and not of the Court.

' 21 8

The

chiefjustice went considerably beyond such rhetorical deference.
When a group opposed to building more prisons challenged a
bond issue which would provide facilities for the mentally re"did not think it possible for courts to follow a formalistic version of the separation
of powers doctrine; they perceived the courts as inevitably making policies in all
circumstances." Id. at 477. Cf., Glick & Vines, supra note 209, at 147 ("New Jersey
judges are alone in their majority adoption of the law-making orientation.").
213 See Style and Citation, supra note 210, at 792, 801, 805-06. During the 1950's
and 1960's, the New Jersey and California Supreme Courts were the ones most
widely regarded as champions of modern legal realism. See id. at 801.
214 Hughes, The Impact of Judicial Transitions in Administration, 10 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 5 (1979).
215 Id. at 3.
216 Sullivan, Hughes 'Prep's For HisJob By Attending Court Session, N.Y. Times, Dec.
10, 1973, at 79, col. 1.
217 77 N.J. 538, 391 A.2d 911 (1978).
218 Id. at 554, 391 A.2d at 919. See also Berke & Sinkin, Developing a "Thorough and
Efficient" School Finance System: Alternatives for Implementing Robinson v. Cahill, 3 J. L.
EDuc. 337 (1974); Trachtenberg, Robinson v. Cahill: The "Thorough and Efficient"
Clause, 38 L. & CONrTEMP. PROB. 312 (1974).
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tarded and mentally ill, a forensic laboratory for the state medical
examiner, and libraries, as well as additional correctional facilities, contending it violated a provision of the New Jersey Constitution requiring that debt be treated only "by a law for some
single object, '2 1 9 Hughes held that the legislature had a right to
send the questioned bond issue to the voters.2 2 ° In Vreeland v.
Byrne,2 2 1 the majority held that the legislature could not satisfy a
constitutional prohibition against appointing a legislator to any
office for which the emolument had been increased during his
term, by withholding temporarily from one of its own members,
who had been named to the state supreme court, a raise it was
giving to the rest of the judiciary. Chief Justice Hughes dissented.222 He wrote, "I believe ... that the statute is entitled to
the highest judicial respect as a bona fide legislative attempt to
comply with the [New Jersey] Constitution. ' 2 23 Occasionally,
Hughes abused even the accepted principles of statutory construction in order to implement policies favored by the legislature. 22 4 There were, however, limits to the willingness of this
former politician to defer to the political branches of government. This was because of his view that the judiciary is "in the
' 22 5
last resort, guarantor of the constitutional promise.
1.

Robinson v. Cahill

Chief Justice Hughes's court exhibited its activist stance in
219
220
221
222
223

N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7, para. 4.
New Jersey Ass'n on Corrections v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199, 403 A.2d 437 (1979).

72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977).
Id. at 308, 370 A.2d at 834 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 319, 370 A.2d at 839 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting); cf., Schreiber, supra note
4, at 105 ("The Chief Justice's opinion in Vreeland emphasized the importance of
due respect to the principle of separation of powers ... ").
224 See, e.g., In re Heller, 73 N.J. 292, 374 A.2d 1191 (1977). In this case, Hughes
held that the State Board of Pharmacy had statutory authority to revoke the certificate of a registered pharmacist for dispensing a controlled substance. The statute
under which the board operated authorized revocation only for "grossly unprofessional conduct," a term whose definition apparently did not include the conduct in
question. See id. at 298-307, 374 A.2d at 1194-99. After the sale in question, the
legislature amended the statute to authorize the Board to revoke the certificates of
those engaging in the sort of conduct involved in Heller. Id. at 307-08, 374 A. 2d at
1199. Relaxing the rules of statutory construction, Hughes "had no difficulty in
holding that the subsequent amendment only amounted to a clarification and restatement of the existing law rather than a change in its substance." Schreiber,
supra note 4, at 103.
225 Hughes, supra note 214, at 3; see also Glick & Vines, supra note 209, at 253
("[s]hould the legislature fail to implement court recommendations ...the judges
may finally change policy themselves").
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the series of cases known as Robinson v. Cahill.2 26 In the first of
these, decided in April 1973, the supreme court ruled that New
Jersey's system of school finance violated a constitutional mandate 2 2 7 that the legislature provide the state with a "thorough
and efficient" system of free public education. 2 28 The court left
to the legislature the task of instituting a new system.2 2 9 It was an
unpleasant job which senators and assemblymen preferred to
avoid, and strong political forces opposed any change in the status quo, particularly any involving a tax increase2 3 ' Although the
court had announced that the statutory scheme would not be disturbed if the legislature enacted legislation which it considered
constitutional by December 31, 1974,231 no legislation was enacted by the deadline 23 2 nor had any been enacted by May 23,
1975. Nevertheless, on the latter date, the court announced,
through Hughes, that "upon thorough deliberation," it had
"concluded that our present disposition should not extend beyond the delineation of a provisional remedy for the school year
1976-1977 should the other Branches of government fail to devise and enact a constitutional system of education in time for its
effectuation for that school year." '2 33 ChiefJustice Hughes wrote
that "[t]he Court's function is to appraise compliance with the
Constitution, not to legislate an educational system, at least if
2 34
that can in any way be avoided.
Unfortunately, judicial involvement could not be forestalled.
226 See infra notes 228, 231, 232, 235, 238 and 243 for full citations to Robinson I,
Robinson II, Robinson IH, Robinson IV, Robinson V, and Robinson VI, respectively.
227 The New Jersey Constitution provides: "The Legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools
for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and
eighteen years." N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4,
1.
228 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) (Robinson I). As a student commentator later explained:
I he court reached this conclusion by interpreting the thorough and
efficient clause as requiring that the educational opportunity for children in the state be equal. It then decided that this equality could not
be achieved by a system of taxation that relied heavily on the local tax
base for its revenues because dollar discrepancies between school districts are inevitable, given the varying size of each district's tax base.
The court therefore invalidated the locally based financing system....
Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A Case Study injudicial Se/f-Legitimization, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
508, 513-14 (1977).
229) See Robinson, 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
2'30 See Note, supra note 228, at 514.
23 1 Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973) (Robinson II).
232 Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333. 343, 339 A.2d 193. 198 (1975) (Robinson 111).
2'33 Id. at 344, 339 A.2d at 198.
234 Id. at 345, 339 A.2d at 199.
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In order to effectuate compliance with the state constitution, the
court ordered that minimum funds be dispersed in a manner different from that provided by existing statutes.2 " 5 The judges declined, however, to intrude any further into the legislative
process.23 6 Hughes considered it "premature and inappropriate
for the Court at the present posture of this complex matter to
undertake, a priori, a comprehensive blueprint for 'thorough and
efficient' education, and 2seek
to impose it upon the other
' 37
Branches of government.

The legislature accepted a "judicial invitation to legislative
action,

' 23 8

which the chiefjustice issued in his opinion; however,

it failed to approve the $300 million in new taxes needed to finance the revised system of school aid 23 9 provided for by the
Public School Education Act of 1975.240 In a per curium opinion,

the court ruled that the new law was constitutional on its faceprovided it was fully funded. 41 In a concurring opinion, Hughes
warned that if effective steps toward equalizing school funding
were not taken soon, "I would feel constrained to then determine
the unconstitutionality in application of the 1975 Act. ...
Hughes and his colleagues soon took that next step. On May
13, 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an injunction
which froze spending on all of the state's public schools.2 43 Seven
days later, Hughes defended this startling ruling in a speech
before the annual meeting of the New Jersey Conference of Mayors. The chief justice told the mayors, "[i]f you could read the4
24
English language, you could see this had to be the result.
With a judicial gun at its head, the legislature finally acted. On
July 9, a triumphant Chief Justice Hughes announced that "[i]n
view of the enactment of legislation which will permit full funding of the Public School Education Act of 1975, the injunction
issued by this court on May 13, 1976 is dissolved.

' 24 5

The court

had successfully fulfilled what he viewed as its proper role, servRobinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975) (Robinson IV).
Id. at 144, 351 A.2d at 718-19.
237 Id. at 145, 351 A.2d at 718-19.
238 Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 514, 355 A.2d 129, 163 (1976) (Pashman, J.,
dissenting) (Robinson V).
239 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1975, at 97, col. 1.
240 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-7 to -33 (West Supp. 1986).
241 Robinson, 69 N.J. at 449, 355 A.2d at 129.
242 Id. at 475, 355 A.2d at 143 (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
243 Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976) (Robinson 17).
244 N.Y. Times, May 20, 1976, at 79, col. 2.
245 Id., July 10, 1976, at 52, col. 3.
235
23(6
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ing as a last resort guarantor that the promises of the state constitution would be fulfilled.
2.

In re Quinlan

While Robinson v. Cahill forced legislators to make new law,
Hughes made new law in In re Quinlan,2 4 6 one of his most widely
cited opinions.247 In Quinlan, Hughes declared that the father of
a twenty-one year old woman, who had suffered severe brain
damage and was existing in a vegetative state, might withdraw
the mechanical life support system which was keeping her
alive. 24 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court seemed to be sentencing the young woman, Karen Ann Quinlan, to immediate
death. 24 9 The decision was a difficult one for the chief justice to
make, and he reached it only after a period of intensive soul
searching. 250 Hughes was probably helped toward his ruling by
the Roman Catholic faith that he shared with the Quinlan's. This
religion permits its followers to elect not to continue extraordinary life-sustaining care in certain situations. Hughes may have
been influenced by statements made by Karen while she was
healthy, which indicated she would have chosen this Church-approved course of action and discontinued the use of the artificial
246 70 N.J. 10, 355

A.2d 647 (1976).

247 A LEXIS search conducted on Feb. 5, 1987 revealed that In re Quinlan has

been cited in 138 opinions, including the courts of 25 states and the District of
Columbia.
248 The Quinlan family concluded that Karen had no chance for recovery and
that the devices keeping her alive should be removed. The hospital and treating
physicians refused to terminate Karen's respirator. Mr. Quinlan then filed suit in
superior court. Hyland & Baime, In re Quinlan: A Synthesis of Law and Medical Technology, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 37, 38-39 (1976). The chancery division rejected his petition to be named guardian of her person with power to discontinue life support
measures. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Ch. Div. 1975), rev'd,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). The supreme court reversed the chancery division
on two points, holding: 1) that Karen's father should be appointed as the guardian
of her person; and 2) that with the concurrence of other members of the family,
should her attending physicians conclude that there was no reasonable possibility
that she could ever emerge from her comatose condition to a cognitive state and
that the use of the life support apparatus ought to be discontinued and should the
hospital ethics committee agree that there was no reasonable possibility of recoverv, Mr. Quinlan might have the life support system withdrawn, without thereby
subjecting anyone involved to either civil or criminal liability. Quinlan. 70 N.J. at
55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
24') Interestingly, Karen remained alive after the life support system was ultimately withdrawn. Karen Ann Quinlan did not die until June 1985. See .4 Long
Twilight Comes to an End, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1985, at 81.
250 See Sederis, supra note 5, at 17.
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life support system. 2 5 ' The chief justice said four years later that
he had experienced no moral afterthoughts about the decision. 2 5 2 Hughes's Catholicism cannot provide a complete explanation for his position in the Quinlan case, however, because on
other issues, such as abortion, he declined to follow the dictates
of the Church.2 5 3
Quinlan is most properly viewed as an effort to reform the
law through judicial activism. At issue in that case was the right to
die with dignity. Such a right could be predicated on the basic
common law conception of self-determination. Other courts,
however, had been reluctant to extend that concept to allow an
individual to choose whether or not to prolong life by extraordinary means.2 5 4 As an activist, Hughes took that bold step, holding that the interest of the state weakens and the right of
individuals to make their own decisions grows "as the degree of
bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims." '2 5 5 Ultimately, he argued, a point is reached where the individual's
rights overcome the state's interest, giving the individual the
right to choose which the law should vindicate.2 5 6 Such broad
questions of public policy are generally resolved by the legislative
branch, and right-to-die legislation had been considered by the
legislatures of several states. 2 57 Hughes and his colleagues, however, were unwilling to wait for the New Jersey Legislature to act.
As the state's attorney general, William F. Hyland, and one of its
assistant attorneys general, David S. Baime, have written, "[t]he
Quinlan decision.., represents a major departure from a normative aspect of society's moral self-conception without legislative
Hyland & Baime, supra note 248, at 38-39.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1980, § 2, at 4, col. 3.
253 In June 1973, Hughes reaffirmed that women in New Jersey had a constitutional right to undergo abortions during the first two months of pregnancy. He
also declined to set aside a superior court judge's order that the state had to pay for
an abortion for a 24 year-old Newark woman, who was on welfare and claimed she
would suffer physical and psychological damage from giving birth to a baby she
feared would be deformed. Id., June 20, 1978, § 2, at 21, col. 2.
254 See Comment, The Right to Die a Natural Death: A4Discussion of In re Quiulau anld
the Califoriia Aatural Death Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 192, 197 (1971).
255 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
256 Id.
257 In 1937, legislation was proposed in Nebraska which would have established
an extensive and detailed scheme for the administration of euthanasia to consenting adults at their own request and to incompetents at the behest of their
guardians. Hyland & Baime, sipra note 248, at 53-54. A similar bill was defeated in
New York in 1947. Two right-to-die measures were introduced in Wisconsin in
1971. Id. Florida had also considered a euthanasia bill. Id.
251
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consultation."2 '5 8 In other words, the opinion represents the antithesis of the way proponents of judicial restraint insist public
policy should be formulated. Quinlan is a striking example of activist judges making public policy and striving to reshape the law.
V.

CONCLUSION

In re Quinlan epitomizes the sort of bold use ofjudicial power
that appealed to Richard J. Hughes. Hughes was an activist because he believed that courts existed to serve the needs of the
people. He repeatedly demonstrated his conviction that the judiciary should use its powers to keep criminals from terrorizing the
public. Similarly, his actions were proof of his belief that the
New Jersey Supreme Court should not stand by while the inaction of other agencies of the government deprived citizens of
their rights.
Even the most activist judiciary could not serve the needs of
the people unless it was efficiently organized and effectively administered. Accordingly, ChiefJustice Hughes focused his attention on improving the administration of justice. By utilizing
executive and lobbying skills acquired as governor, he further improved the court system created by the 1947 constitution. It is
no wonder, then, that so many applauded his efforts so vigorously when RichardJ. Hughes retired as the leader of the judicial
branch of New Jersey government.
258

Id.

at

59.

